Structural Properties of Twisted Reed-Solomon Codes with Applications to
  Cryptography by Beelen, Peter et al.
Structural Properties of Twisted Reed–Solomon
Codes with Applications to Cryptography
Peter Beelen1, Martin Bossert2, Sven Puchinger3, and Johan Rosenkilde1
1Department of Applied Mathematics & Computer Science, Technical University of Denmark, Lyngby, Denmark
2Institute of Communications Engineering, Ulm University, Ulm, Germany
3Institute for Communications Engineering, Technical University of Munich (TUM), Munich, Germany
Email: pabe@dtu.dk, martin.bossert@uni-ulm.de, sven.puchinger@tum.de, jsrn@jsrn.dk
Abstract—We present a generalisation of Twisted Reed–
Solomon codes containing a new large class of MDS codes.
We prove that the code class contains a large subfamily that
is closed under duality. Furthermore, we study the Schur
squares of the new codes and show that their dimension is
often large. Using these structural properties, we single out a
subfamily of the new codes which could be considered for code-
based cryptography: These codes resist some existing structural
attacks for Reed–Solomon-like codes, i.e. methods for retrieving
the code parameters from an obfuscated generator matrix.
Index Terms—MDS Codes, Reed–Solomon Codes, McEliece
Cryptosystem, Structural Attacks
I . I N T R O D U C T I O N
Twisted Reed–Solomon codes [1] are maximum distance
separable (MDS) codes1 that can be efficiently decoded.
Their construction is based on Reed–Solomon (RS) codes,
by adding an extra monomial (“twist”) to the low-degree
evaluation polynomials and choosing the evaluation points
in a suitable way. We present a generalisation of twisted RS
codes, where instead of one additional monomial, we add `
monomials (“twists”) to the evaluation polynomials, similar
to the recent extension of twisted Gabidulin codes [2]. We
describe a large family of these which are MDS codes. We
study the Schur square of twisted RS code and show that,
unlike for RS codes, the dimension of the Schur square is not
small. Moreover, we prove that the dual of a large class of
twisted RS codes is equivalent to a twisted RS code. Finally,
we show that decoding is feasible for codes with few twists.
As a potential application, we consider the use of twisted
RS codes in the McEliece cryptosystem [3], which is a
public-key cryptosystem and one of the candidates for post-
quantum cryptography: a structured code C with an efficient
decoding algorithm is the “secret key”, while an obfuscated
generator matrix G˜ of C is made public, together with the
decoding algorithm’s decoding radius τ . Encryption consists
of encoding a secret message with G˜ and adding τ errors
at random. A “structural attack” on the system is to recover
an efficiently decodable code that is sufficiently close to C
so that decoding the encrypted message is feasible. Such
an attack is mostly interesting if it is faster than a generic
decoding algorithm, e.g. information-set decoding see e.g. [3]–
[5]. The original proposal [3], which remains unbroken, uses
binary Goppa codes. For most other proposed codes, efficient
structural attacks have been found (cf. [6]). Attacks on RS-
like codes were presented in [7]–[10].
We single out a family of twisted RS codes for which
some of these attacks will provably not work. For the only
This work was done while S. Puchinger was with Ulm University.
1Their length n, dimension k, and minimum distance d fulfil d = n−k+1.
two other attacks that we know of, Wieschebrink’s attack [8]
on the dual code and Wieschebrink’s squaring attack [9], we
give compelling arguments for why they should not work,
but more thorough analysis is needed. The number of twists
in our codes is ` = b 1Rc for long enough codes, where R is
the code rate.
The new codes are over large fields with field size q ≈ n2` .
This increases the size of storing the public key at a given
length and dimension, i.e. the generator matrix, but since the
complexities of generic attacks strongly depend on the field
size, quite short lengths are sufficient for a target security
level. We give example parameters for security levels 2100
and 2128 whose public key sizes are reduced by factors 2.7
and 7.4 compared to suggested parameters when using binary
Goppa codes [11], [12] for the same security levels.
Notationally, matrices and vectors are generally bold-face,
e.g. A and v. If v is a vector, then vi denotes its i’th element.
When adding a constant to a vector, e.g. v+1, we really mean
v + (1, . . . , 1). The diagonal matrix with diagonal entries v
is denoted diag(v). We say that two codes are “equivalent”
if one can be obtained from the other by permuting positions
and element-wise scaling with non-zero field elements.
I I . M U LT I - T W I S T E D R E E D – S O L O M O N C O D E S
A. Definition
Let V ⊂ Fq[X] be a Fq-linear subspace of polynomials.
Let α1, . . . , αn ∈ Fq be distinct and write α = [α1, . . . , αn].
We call α1, . . . , αn the evaluation points. Then we define
the evaluation map of α on V by
evα(·) : V → Fnq , f 7→ [f(α1), . . . , f(αn)].
In this notation, an [n, k] Reed–Solomon (RS) code with
evaluation points α is just the image of evα(Fq[X]<k), where
Fq[X]<k denotes the set of polynomials in Fq[X] of degree
at most k − 1. A generalised Reed–Solomon code (GRS) is
a code which is equivalent to an RS code.
Definition 1: Given a finite field Fq and code parameters
[n, k], let ` ∈ Z>0 and t,h ∈ Z`>0 such that
• The ti are all distinct and 1 ≤ ti ≤ n− k.
• The hi are all distinct and 0 ≤ hi < k.
Furthermore, let η ∈ (Fq \{0})`. The set of (t,h,η)-twisted
polynomials is given as:
Pn,kt,h,η =

k−1∑
i=0
fiX
i +
∑`
j=1
ηjfhjX
k−1+tj ∣∣ fi ∈ Fq
 .
Pn,kt,h,η is a k-dimensional Fq-linear subspace of Fq[X]. We
say that the space of polynomials has ` twists, each with
twist ti, hook hi and coefficient ηi.
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A (t,h,η)-twisted Reed–Solomon code is given byα ∈ Fnq
with distinct entries and twisted polynomials Pn,kt,h,η as:
Cn,k(α, t,h,η) = evα(Pn,kt,h,η) ⊆ Fnq .
For brevity, we will use the phrase twisted RS codes. Note that
Cn,k(α, t,h,η) indeed has dimension k since the evaluation
map evα(·) is injective on polynomials of degree < n and
any f ∈ Pn,kt,h,η satisfies deg f ≤ k − 1 + maxi{ti} < n.
The twisted RS codes of [1] are the special case of the
above definition when ` = 1; these will be referred to as
“single-twisted RS codes”. Specifically, the (∗)-twisted codes
introduced in [1] are the codes Cn,k(α, 1, 0, η), where the
set of coordinates α is a subset of {0} ∪ G for a proper
subgroup G of F∗q and (−1)kη−1 ∈ F∗q \G. The (+)-twisted
codes from [1] were defined as Cn,k(α, 1, k − 1, η), where
the set of coordinates α is a subset of {∞}∪V for a proper
subspace V of Fq and η−1 ∈ Fq \ V . Note that in [1] we
defined evaluation at ∞, but that in the current paper we for
simplicity refrain from using ∞ as an evaluation point.
B. A Constructive Class of MDS Twisted RS Codes
Not all twisted RS codes as defined in the previous section
are MDS. We will now describe a simple way to choose
the parameters which lead to a large family of MDS codes.
This generalises a construction in [1] and is also inspired by
a recently proposed family of twisted Gabidulin codes [2]
which are MRD, i.e., MDS with respect to the rank metric.
Consider some [n, k] `-twisted RS code Cn,k(α, t,h,η)
and write H = {hi | i = 1, . . . , `}. A generator matrix
G ∈ Fq[η]k×n for Cn,k(α, t,h,η) can be obtained as the
image of evα on the monomial-like basis of Pn,kt,h,η; that is,
row j of G equals evα(xj) if j /∈ H , while row hi equals
evα(x
hi + ηix
k−1+ti). Recall that Cn,k(α, t,h,η) is MDS
if and only if any k columns of G are linearly independent.
Theorem 1: Let s0, . . . , s` ∈ Z≥0 such that Fs0 ( Fs1 (
· · · ( Fs` = Fq is a chain of subfields. Let k < n ≤ s0
and α1, . . . , αn ∈ Fs0 be distinct, and let t, h, and η be
chosen as in Section II-A and such that ηi ∈ Fsi \ Fsi−1 for
i = 1, . . . , `. Then Cn,k(α, t,h,η) is MDS.
Proof: We will prove that any k × k sub-matrix of G
is invertible, where G is the generator matrix defined above.
Consider an arbitrary such sub-matrix Gˆ. Note that det Gˆ will
equal a sum of terms of the form
∏
i/∈H α
i
σ(i)
∏`
j=1(α
hj
σ(hj)
+
ηjα
k−1+tj
σ(hj)
) ranging over all k-permutations σ. In partic-
ular, we can write det Gˆ = η`u` + v` where u`, v` ∈
Fs0 [η1, . . . , η`−1] ⊆ Fs`−1 and both of total degree at most
1 in the η1, . . . , η`−1. Since η` /∈ Fs`−1 then det Gˆ = 0 only
if u` = v` = 0. We can continue similarly and write both u`
and v` as linear expressions in η`−1 over Fs0 [η1, . . . , η`−2]
and conclude that their coefficients all needs to be identically
zero for u` = v` = 0. Continuing with the remaining ηi, we
finally conclude that det Gˆ = 0 is only possible if a set of
linear expressions of the form η1u1 + v1 with u1, v1 ∈ Fs0
are all identically 0 – which none of them can be. Thus Gˆ
is invertible, and since Gˆ was chosen arbitrarily.
This construction gives quite short codes: if we use ` twists,
then the field size q has q ≥ n2` , where n is the length.
C. Decoding by brute-forcing the twists
A simple decoding strategy for C = Cn,k(α, t,h,η) with
` twists is to guess ` coefficients g1, . . . , g` ∈ Fq and then
decode r−evα(
∑`
i=1 giηiX
ti+k−1) as if it is a codeword in
the [n, k] RS code with evaluation points α. This will succeed
when gi = fhi for i = 1, . . . , `, where evα(f) is the sent
codeword and f ∈ Pn,kt,h,η . This requires q` ≥ n`2
`
rounds of
RS decoding to succeed. Some of these rounds might output
purported message polynomials fˆ0+. . .+fˆk−1xk−1 for which
gi 6= fˆhi : these will not correspond to close codewords in
the twisted RS code and should be sifted away.
This is a τ -error correcting decoder for C when using a τ -
error correcting RS decoder – even if the minimum distance
of the twisted RS code is much lower than n− k+ 1. If τ ≤
bd−12 c, then decoding succeeds for exactly one guess of the gi.
Similarly, if we use an RS list-decoder, e.g. the Guruswami–
Sudan algorithm [13], then the total output list size will be
bounded by the Johnson bound [14] or the stronger Cassuto–
Bruck bound [15].
The complexity will be q` times the cost of the RS
decoder. The current best complexity for half-the-minimum
distance RS decoding is O(n log2 n log log n) operations in
Fq [16], while list-decoding up to the Johnson radius using
the Guruswami–Sudan algorithm has a Las Vegas randomized
algorithm in O(m4n(log2(mn) + log(q)) log log(mn)) oper-
ations in Fq [17], [18], where m is the “list size” parameter of
the decoder. In either case, the twisted RS decoder then has a
complexity of O∼(n`2
`+14`) bit operations, ignoring ` log(n)-
factors, considering m a constant, and assuming q ∈ O(n2`).
m can be considered a constant if one takes τ = (1− )Jn,k
for some constant  < 1, where Jn,k = n −
√
n(k − 1) is
the Johnson radius.
Hence, decoding is feasible only for a very small number
of twists, e.g., ` = 1, 2, and finding more efficient algorithms
is an open problem.
I I I . S T R U C T U R A L P R O P E R T I E S
A. Duals
Twisted RS codes do not generally seem to be closed under
duality; however, if we choose evaluation points which form
a multiplicative group, then they are:
Theorem 2: Let α1, . . . , αn be a multiplicative subgroup
of F∗q and let Cn,k(α, t,h,η) be some twisted RS code
with α = [α1, . . . , αn]. Then Cn,k(α, t,h,η)⊥ equals
Cn,n−k(α, k − h, n− k − t,−η) up to column multipliers.
Proof: Let J be the matrix with 1’s on the anti-diagonal
and zeroes elsewhere of suitable size. Left-multiplying by J
reverses rows while right-multiplying reverses columns. We
denote by V the n× n Vandermonde matrix over α, i.e.
V := [αj−1i ]i=1,...,n, j=1,...,k .
Since the entries of α form a multiplicative group, we have
αni = 1 for all i and by [19], we obtain(
V T
)−1
= J · V · diag(α/n)
Similar to Section II-A, a generator matrix of Cn,k(α, t,h,η)
is given by G = [I | L] · V , where
Lij =
{
ηµ, if (i, j) = (hµ + 1, tµ)
0, else.
We claim that a parity check matrix for Cn,k(α, t,h,η) is:
H = [I | −JLTJ ] · V · diag(α/n) .
H has rank n− k so left is to show G ·HT = 0. Note that
H = J [−LT | I]JV diag(α/n) = J [−LT | I](V −1)T .
Therefore, G ·HT = [I | L]
[−L
I
]
JT = 0 and the entries
of −JLTJ are of the form
(−JLTJ)[i, j] =
{
−ηµ, (i, j) = (n− k − tµ + 1, k − hµ)
0, else.
In other words, a twist xhµ + ηµxk−1+tµ becomes the twist
xn−k−tµ + (−ηµ)x(n−k−1)+(k−hµ) in the dual code.
Note that Theorem 2 implies that the dual of a (∗)-twisted
code from [1] is equivalent to a (∗)-twisted code as long as
0 is not a coordinate of α.
B. Schur Squares
There has been a rising interest in the Schur product of
codes both as an independent object of study, but also due
to its occurrence in applications of codes, see e.g. [20], [21]
and references therein. In particular, it is key in the structural
attacks on the McEliece cryptosystem using certain Goppa
codes or other RS-like codes [10].
Definition 2: The Schur product, or component-wise prod-
uct, of two vectors x,y ∈ Fnq is x?y := [x1 ·y1, . . . , xn ·yn].
The Schur product of two linear codes C1, C2 ⊆ Fnq is the set
C1 ? C2 := 〈c1 ? c2 | c1 ∈ C1, c2 ∈ C2〉Fq .
We write C2 := C ? C for the Schur square code.
An [n, k] code C fulfills dim C2 ≤ min{n, 12k(k − 1)}.
Furthermore, if C is MDS then dim C2 ≥ min{2k − 1, n}
[21, p.31]. GRS codes attain this lower bound with equality.
Since twisted RS codes are obtained by evaluating specific
polynomials, we show below how to obtain a lower bound
for the dimension of its Schur square. For a given evaluation
vector α, we denote for a polynomial f ∈ Fq[X] by f the
polynomial remainder of f modulo
∏n
i=1(X − αi).
Theorem 3: Let D = {deg(f · g) | f, g ∈ Pn,kt,h,η}. Then
dim Cn,k(α, t,h,η)2 ≥ ∣∣D∣∣ .
Proof: First of all note that evα(f) = evα(f), since
the evaluation map evα(·) vanishes on any multiple of∏n
i=1(X − αi). Further, the evaluation map evα(·) is an
injective homomorphism on Fq[X]<n, the space of polyno-
mials of degree at most n− 1. This implies that
dim Cn,k(α, t,h,η)2 = dim〈f · g | f, g ∈ Pn,kt,h,η〉 ≥
∣∣D∣∣ .
Especially if the evaluation vector consists of elements of a
multiplicative subgroup of F∗q , the bound in the theorem is
easy to compute, since in that case
∏n
i=1(X−αi) = Xn−1.
Alternatively, the bound implies the following simpler
formulation for which no remainders need be computed:
Corollary 4: Let D = {deg(f · g) | f, g ∈ Pn,kt,h,η}. Then,
dim Cn,k(α, t,h,η)2 ≥ |{d ∈ D | d < n}| .
Proof: This follows from {d ∈ D | d < n} ⊂ D.
This corollary is usually easy to apply: let S be the degrees
occurring in the usual monomial-like basis of Pn,kt,h,η , i.e.:
S = ({0, . . . , k − 1} \ {hi}i=1,...,`) ∪ {ti + k − 1}i=1,...,`.
Then D = {d1 + d2 | d1, d2 ∈ S} ∩ {0, . . . , n− 1}.
C. Separation from GRS codes
Consider a twisted RS code C. Since twisted RS codes are
close kin to GRS codes, one can consider the question of
finding GRS codes DI N N ,DO U T such that
DI N N ⊂ C ⊂ DO U T ,
while maximising dimDI N N and minimising dimDO U T ,
i.e. the “separation” of C from GRS codes. Note that
C ⊂ DO U T ⇐⇒ (DO U T)⊥ ⊂ C⊥ and that (DO U T)⊥ is a
GRS code itself where we now try to maximise dim(DO U T)⊥.
When applying the codes to cryptography, we will motivate
further why we consider these questions. The following three
statements separate any code C from GRS codes from above
and below based entirely on the dimension of C2. Since
many twisted RS codes have large Schur square, this provides
separation from GRS codes.
Lemma 5: Let Cn,k(α, t,h,η) be a twisted RS code. Then
Cn,k(α, t,h,η) contains an RS code of dimension mini{hi}
and is contained in an RS code of dimension k + maxi ti.
Proof: This follows from the observations that
{xj | 0 ≤ j ≤ min
i
{hi} − 1} ⊂ Pn,kt,h,η ⊂
{xj | 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 + max
i
{ti}} .
The description in the preceding section on the Schur square
dim C2 of a twisted RS code C gives a way to prove C is
non-GRS: if dim C2 > 2k−1, or if dim(C⊥)2 > 2(n−k)−1,
then it must be non-GRS. This can be strengthened to bound
the dimension of the smallest GRS code which contains C
or C⊥ supplementing the observation from Lemma 5.
Proposition 6: Let C be an [n, k] code with k < n/2 and
such that dim C2 = 2k − 1 + δ for δ > 0. Then if DO U T is
a GRS code with C ⊆ DO U T , then dimDO U T ≥ k + δ/2.
Proof: Since C2 ⊆ D2O U T then dim(D2O U T) ≥ 2k−1+δ
i.e. dim(DO U T) ≥ k + δ/2.
Proposition 7: Let C be an [n, k] code with k < n/2 and
such that dim C2 = 2k − 1 + δ for δ > 0. If DI N N is a GRS
code with DI N N ⊆ C, then dimDI N N ≤
√(
k − 52
)2 − 2δ+ 52 .
Proof: Let K = dimDI N N . Pick a basis c1, . . . , cK of
DI N N and extend this basis with k−K vectors cK+1, . . . , ck
to form a basis for C. Then C2 must be spanned by a basis
of D2I N N together with all Schur products ci ? cj with 1 ≤
i ≤ K < j ≤ k, together with all Schur products ci ?cj with
K < i, j ≤ k. In total
dim C2 ≤ (2K − 1) +K(k−K) + 12 (k−K)(k−K − 1) .
This implies
(
K − 52
)2 ≤ (k − 52)2 − 2δ.
Remark 8: A simpler question than separation from GRS
codes is simply inequivalence to GRS codes. We considered
this question for single-twisted RS codes in [1], using different
tools; unfortunately the proof of [1, Theorem 18] contains a
mistake and its statement is not true in general. However, the
Schur square arguments above show that still most twisted
RS codes are not GRS codes.
I V. A P P L I E D T O T H E M C E L I E C E C RY P T O S Y S T E M
In this section, we present a subfamily of twisted RS codes
which provably resist the known structural attacks on RS-like
codes by Sidelnikov–Shestakov [7] and Couvreur et al. [10].
We also discuss three attacks by Wieschebrink: that of [8]
does not apply, and the same attack on the dual code seems
to not apply. Thirdly, the squaring attack [9] also seems to
not apply.
Definition 3: Choose positive integers k < n ≤ q0−1 with
q0 a prime power and 2
√
n+ 6 < k ≤ n2 − 2. Furthermore,
choose ` ∈ Z≥0 such that n+1k−√n−2 < ` < min{k+1; 2nk −
2;
√
n − 4}. Let r := dn+1`+2 e + 2, let q = q2
`
0 , and for
i = 1, . . . , `, let
ti = (i+ 1)(r − 2)− k + 2 and hi = r − 1 + i.
Then the family of codes Fn,k` is the set of all codes
Cn,k(α, t,h,η), where α ∈ (Fq0 \ {0})n with distinct
elements, and where ηi ∈ Fq2i0 \Fq2i−10 . Further, for n | q0−1,
we let F˜n,k` ⊂ Fn,k` be those codes which furthermore satisfy
that α form a multiplicative subgroup of Fq0 .
It is technical but easy to show that for any n ≥ 72 and any
k satisfying the restrictions, then there is always a valid choice
for `. Also, the family Fn,k` is well-defined (cf. Definition 1)
for all triples (n, k, `) satisfying the restrictions.
By Theorem 1 all codes in Fn,k` are MDS. It is clear that
for a fixed rate R = k/n, the lower bound for ` in Definition 3
converges to 1R − 1 for n → ∞, so for large enough n, it
suffices to choose ` = b 1Rc.
Remark 9: If one desires a code rate greater than 12 , for
n | q0 − 1 one can use the dual of a code in F˜n,k` . These
will be twisted RS codes with ` twists, by Theorem 2, and
will resist the attacks since the primal codes do.
A. Resistance to Schur Square Distinguishing
Couvreur et al. [10] built a structural attack on McEliece
with RS codes using the fact that the square code of a k-
dimensional RS code D, and any shortening at up to two
positions, has abnormally low dimension when k < n/2:
dim(D2) = min{2k−1, n}. By comparison, a random linear
code achieves dim(C2) = min{ 12k(k + 1), n} with high
probability [22]. In this section we show that the codes of
Fn,k` are impervious to this attack.
Theorem 10: Let n, k, ` be as in Definition 3, and let
C ∈ Fn,k` . Then dim C2 = n and dim((C⊥)2) = n.
Proof: Let r, t,h be as in Definition 3. We will use
Corollary 4, so let D = {deg(f · g) | f, g ∈ Pn,kt,h,η}. Since
x0, . . . , xr−1 ∈ Pn,kt,h,η then 0, . . . , 2r − 2 ∈ D. For each i,
there is a polynomial of degree ti + k− 1 in Pn,kt,h,η , so also
(i+1)(r−2)+1, (i+1)(r−2)+2, . . . , (i+1)(r−2)+r ∈ D.
Summing up we have 0, 1, . . . , (`+ 2)(r − 2) + 2 ∈ D. By
definition of r, we have (` + 2)(r − 2) + 2 ≥ n − 1, so
Corollary 4 implies the claim for C. We have dim(C⊥)2 = n
since C⊥ is MDS and has dimension > n/2 [21, p.31].
By a simple, but more technical, argument it can be shown
that also shortenings of the codes at up to two positions
have maximal Schur square dimension. The proof uses that
the shortened code has evaluation polynomials of degrees
2, . . . , r and ti + k − 1, so its Schur square has evaluation
polynomials of degrees 2, . . . , n− 1 (i.e., n− 2 consecutive
degrees), which implies the claim since 0 is not included in
the evaluation points. This proves the resistance against the
attack in [10, Section 6].
Remark 11: It is not hard to come up with more twisted RS
codes of Schur square dimension n. The crucial ingredient
of the proof of Theorem 10 is that x0, . . . , xr−1 ∈ Pn,kt,h,η .
As long as all hooks hi are at least r, then the argument
will work. The reason for setting h1 as small as possible
is discussed in the following section, but the remaining hi
could be chosen as any subset of {r+ 1, . . . , k− 1}. Further,
whenever (`+ 2)r is much bigger than n− 1, the choice of
ti can be perturbed in many ways.
B. Resistance to Sidelnikov–Shestakov & Wieschebrink attack
The Sidelnikov–Shestakov (SiS) attack [7] completely
breaks McEliece with GRS codes; we use the description
from [9]. Let [I | A] be the systematic generator matrix of
a GRS code with evaluation points α ∈ Fnq and column
multipliers v ∈ (F?q)n. Using the automorphisms of a
GRS code, the attacker can assume α1 = 0 and α1 = 1.
Row i of the matrix is the evaluation of the polynomial
fi = ci
∏k
µ=1,µ6=i(x − αµ), where ci is a suitably chosen
constant in Fq. It is well known [23], [24] that the matrix
A is a Cauchy matrix exactly when the code is GRS. This
means that for dj =
∏k
ν=1(αj − αν) for j = k + 1, . . . , n,
we have the simple expression
Ai j =
ci·dj
αj−αi . (1)
Due to this compact formula, after guessing the values
c1, c2 ∈ Fq, the remaining secret values α3, . . . , αn and
v1, . . . , vn can be computed by simple linear equations.
Since Theorem 10 shows that the codes of Fn,k` have large
Schur square, then none of these codes is GRS. Therefore,
a systematic generator matrix for these codes has [I | A]
where A is not Cauchy. Since the SiS attack is rested on the
simple Cauchy structure, it will not work for these codes.
Wieschebrink [8] generalised the SiS to apply for sub-
codes of RS codes of small codimension. Assume that we
have given a k× n generator matrix [I | A] of a subcode of
an (n, k+ δ) RS code. Then, the i-th row of the matrix A is
obtained from a polynomial fi = ci(x)
∏k
µ=1,µ6=i(x− αµ),
where ci(x) ∈ Fq[X] is a polynomial of degree deg ci(x) ≤ δ.
One now needs to guess the polynomials c1(x) and c2(x)
instead of only scalars, which will succeed after at most ≈ q2δ
iterations. For large enough values of δ, this is infeasible.
For C ∈ Fn,k` , since dim C2 = n, then Proposition 6
implies that any GRS code DO U T with C ⊂ DO U T must have
dimDO U T ≥ k + (n− 2k + 1)/2. This very quickly makes
Wieschebrink’s attack infeasible for C.
Wieschebrink’s attack can also be carried out on the
dual code, so that one seeks a GRS code D⊥I N N such that
C⊥ ⊂ D⊥I N N , i.e. DI N N ⊂ C. If dimDI N N is close to dim C,
this is a bad sign: it may reveal structural information on C
or may drastically reduce the cost of brute-force decoding
the encrypted message. We are at this point unable to
categorically refute this attack. Proposition 7 provides only
a small separation between DI N N and C, and it is not hard
to realise that this separation can never be greater than the
number of twists `, which we wish to keep fairly small for
decoding purposes. As per Lemma 5, the obvious GRS code
contained in C is the one with the same evaluation points
α and dimension min{h1} = r. If C contains a larger GRS
code, it seems it would have to be a surprising, or spurious,
code with other evaluation points and column multipliers.
If we choose n | q0 − 1 and C ∈ F˜n,k` , then C⊥ is itself
a twisted RS code by Section II-C. Now the obvious GRS
code DI N N such that C⊥ ⊂ D⊥I N N is the one having the same
evaluation points and dimension max{t˜i + n− k} = n− r,
where t˜ = k − h is the twist vector of C⊥. Perhaps this
strengthens the belief that it is not likely that C contains
another, surprisingly large GRS code.
Summarising, assuming that C ∈ Fn,k` contains no surpris-
ingly large GRS code, then Wieschebrink’s attack on C or
C⊥ will have work factor roughly q2δ if
k ∈ [r + δ, n+12 − δ] ≈ [ n`+1 − δ, n2 − δ] .
C. Wieschebrink’s Squaring Attack
Wieschebrink gave yet another attack in [9] for McEliece
with subcodes of RS codes: given a scrambled generator
matrix for the [n, k] code C which is a subcode of an unknown
GRS code DO U T , the attack finds the parameters of DO U T .
The idea is that C2 and D2O U T agree with high probability,
if C is a random subcode of DO U T with not too small co-
dimension. If dimDO U T > n/2 then one can first shorten C
and DO U T at enough random positions and then consider their
square. Applied to twisted RS codes, if C ∈ Fn,k` then we
saw in the previous subsection that dimDO U T > n/2, thus
the squaring attack should first shorten C at some random
positions. If we can show that (C∗)2 is never, or rarely, a GRS
code, where C∗ is some shortening of C, then C is resistant
to (straightforward version of) the squaring attack.
At the time of writing, we don’t have a such a theorem.
However, we believe the following approach is promising:
assume that we shorten at the first s positions and write
α = (αS |α∗) with αS having length s. Then C∗ = evα∗(P)
where P = {f ∈ Pn,kt,h,η | f(α) = 0 for α ∈ αS}.
Hence dim(C∗)2 can be characterised using the tools of
Section III-B by looking at D¯ := {deg ((f · g) mod M) |
f, g ∈ P}, where M = ∏ni=s+1(X − αi). Since the set
{deg f | f ∈ P} will likely have gaps as well as a smallest
element of at least s, it seems unlikely that D¯ will contain
only 2(k − s) elements. Then (C∗)2 is not a GRS code.
D. Example Code Parameters
We consider the following example parameters: Let
(n, k) = (255, 117), ` = 1, q0 = 28 and pick a code over
Fq, q = 216, with these parameters as in Definition 3. The
number of such codes is larger than n!(q−√q) ≈ 22038 ·216.
The actual number of inequivalent codes is presumably much
smaller, but seems to suffice for avoiding exhaustive search
attack. Under the assumptions of the previous subsections,
the work factor of Wieschebrink’s attack is 2336.
As for generic decoding attacks, we consider classical
information set decoding [3], [4]2 with work factor WI =(
n
k
)
/
(
n−τ
k
)
k3 log2(q)
2, where τ is the number of errors
inserted by the sender. Since the example codes can correct
up to τunique = 69 errors uniquely and τlist = 83 using a list
decoder, we obtain the following work factors for unique and
list decoding, respectively: WI,unique ≥ 2105, WI,list ≥ 2126.
In both cases, the key size is
Ksys = k(n− k) log2(q)/8192 = 31.5 KB,
using a systematic generator matrix for the public key.
The security level of the two variants above is ≥ 2100 resp.
≈ 2128. We compare the key size to parameter proposals for
binary Goppa codes of similar security levels:
2100 [11]: (n, k) = (2048, 1608), τ = 40, K = 86.4 KB.
2128 [12]: (n, k) = (3262, 2482), τ = 66, K = 236.3 KB.
In this example, twisted RS codes reduce the key size by a
factor 2.7 and 7.4 at security levels ≈ 2100 resp. ≈ 2128.
V. C O N C L U S I O N
We have presented a natural generalisation of twisted RS
codes, pointed out a large subfamily of MDS codes, and
presented a decoder that is feasible for ` = 1, 2 twists. Those
codes whose evaluation points form a multiplicative group
are closed under duality with explicit duals. We also showed
that the Schur square of a twisted RS code is usually large,
2The improvements for non-binary information-set decoding considered
in [5] seem to be not more efficient since, unlike the original algorithm [3],
the cost of an iteration strongly depends on the field size, which is large for
our codes: q = 216. However, this should be more carefully studied e.g. by
estimating the number of iterations by a Markov chain simulation as in [5].
which shows that they are in a sense “far” from GRS codes,
cf. Lemma 5. Furthermore, we identified a subfamily of
twisted RS codes that resist some known structural attacks
on the McEliece cryptosystem: Sidenlikov–Shestakov [7],
Wieschebrink [8] and Schur square-distinguishing [10]. For
Wieschebrink’s attack on the dual code and Wieschebrink’s
squaring attack [9] we could say only that the attack does
not seem to apply. We gave example parameters that achieve
lower key sizes than the original McEliece cryptosystem for
the same security level.
Whether (some sub-families of) twisted RS codes are
suitable for the McEliece cryptosystem or not remains to
be seen, but we believe that our analysis motivates looking
closer at this question: this includes studying Wieschebrink’s
attack on the dual code and Wieschebrink’s squaring attack, as
well as seeking completely new attacks utilizing the particular
structure of twisted RS codes.
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